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Stability Maintenance and Chinese
Media: Beyond Political Communication? 
Jonathan HASSID and Wanning SUN 
For political scientists, Chinese media practices and communication 
systems provide an enduring prism through which to understand how 
Chinese politics work. By contrast, for media and communication 
scholars, politics is one of the main domains in which various media 
and communication forms, practices and policies can be fruitfully 
explored. While political scientists and media scholars share this 
common interest, they tend to pursue different research agendas, 
adopt different methods of data-gathering and analysis, and at times 
seem to speak a different language. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to 
say that political scientists and media scholars may even have differ-
ent understandings of what constitutes valid empirical data or worthy 
lines of inquiry and which theoretical models and paradigms are fash-
ionable or out of date. Because of this divide, the two groups of 
scholars unearth different findings and reach different conclusions. 
This leads to the curious situation in which scholars of the same field – 
but in different disciplines – talk past each other, or worse still, look 
upon each other’s work with deep suspicion. 
While gulfs understandably exist across disciplinary boundaries, 
they are, to a great extent, avoidable. In fact, collaboration between 
the disciplines of anthropology and media studies has provided some 
shining examples of cross-fertilization bearing intellectual fruit (e.g. 
Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, and Larkin 2002). And there are signs that as 
the Chinese media are becoming increasingly regionalized and local-
ized, it is becoming possible to explore the analytic perspectives de-
veloped in the field of geography to make sense of the new develop-
ments in scale, place and space (Sun and Chio 2012). Given this fruit-
ful collaboration, there are certain to be advantages in exploring dia-
logue between political scientists and media scholars.  
So where do the two fields differ? Political scientists see the Chi-
nese media as just one aspect – albeit an important one – of China’s 
political system; for communications scholars, the focus is on the 
media itself and how it is nestled within the Chinese economy and 
society (Keane and Sun 2013). This differing emphasis determines 
which areas the two camps tend to investigate. Political scientists, 
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inclined toward investigating state–society relations and the loci of 
power, often focus on state control and media resistance. This focus 
in turn shapes what questions are asked, what data are gathered and 
what methods are used. For example, political scientists’ recent spate 
of studies on the emerging electronic media (including special issues 
in Political Communication [2011], China Quarterly [2011] and the Journal 
of Communication [2012]) generally adopt a “cat and mouse” frame to 
investigate the tensions between the party-state’s desire for control 
and the efforts of a few select netizens to circumvent that control. 
With this approach, political scientists see the media as a potential 
check on arbitrary state power, often adopting the normative underly-
ing assumption that the media can serve as a relatively neutral “fourth 
estate” (Keane and Sun 2013). 
Media and communication scholars concerned with political 
communication are equally interested in the question of the power, 
behaviour and impact of the party-state, but the object of their analy-
sis is generally not politics per se. Rather, communications scholars 
focus on the assemblage of institutional practices, technologies, money, 
media texts, practitioners and consumers, and how particular ar-
rangements of these elements shape the media power structure and 
ultimately the meaning of political messages. But there is a further 
internal division of labour within media studies: political economists 
“follow the money” through funding arrangements, ownership, rat-
ings and regulation, while critical media and cultural scholars trace 
power (in the Foucauldian sense) through a dialectical relationship 
between the “culture of production” and “production of culture”. 
Rather than focusing on propaganda and control, media and commu-
nications scholars are more concerned with the quotidian nature and 
cultural practice of media production and the socialization and 
(de)politicization of individuals through media consumption.  
Most media scholars tend to shy away from adopting a control-
vs.-resistance lens. In fact, cultural studies as a discipline seems to 
have long reached a consensus that since there is no control that is 
total and no resistance that is complete, it may make more sense to 
talk about the effects of the media on supporting or fracturing ideol-
ogy and hegemony. Media scholars are just as interested as political 
scientists in the possibilities of new media and technologies, but the 
former largely focus on the ways in which these new tools are used to 
serve political and social ends.  
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Since there is a plethora of media forms (including journalism, 
entertainment, service information and advertising), media scholars 
are cautious about ascribing behaviour to the media in general (for 
example, referring to “the media”, “journalists”, and so on). Similarly, 
this critical lens is not limited to looking at the news, the public 
sphere, political blogs or weibo discussion topics – as political scien-
tists tend to do – for clues of change or continuity in political com-
munication practices. Instead, media scholars tend to look for hidden 
ideological – rather than overtly political – messages, and are commit-
ted to showing that the seemingly apolitical are often in fact deeply 
ideological. Put simply, while political scientists look for evidence of 
political control and political resistance, media scholars engage in 
finding traces of depoliticization. 
These differences are manifest in how scholars from both discip-
lines interact with and cite each other. A search for “Chinese media” 
as a topic in the ISI Web of Knowledge, for example, reveals 333 
articles published between 2000 and early 2012, with the number 
rising steadily – almost exponentially – in recent years.  
Figure 1: Articles on the Chinese Media 
Note: 2012 articles represent only the first part of the year. 
Source: ISI Web of Science (numbers are approximate). 
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These 333 articles, not surprisingly, are mostly divided between 
communication and political science, with sociology a distant third. 
Allowing for the fact that an individual paper can fall into multiple 
categories, approximately two-thirds of these papers are communica-
tion-based, and another quarter are based in political science. But 
apart from some early, groundbreaking articles that are cited in 
roughly this ratio, the citation pattern does not follow this disciplinary 
breakdown. Political scientists, in particular, seem to ignore most 
communications papers, as only 12 per cent of the 599 papers that 
cited these 333 are in political science, compared with nearly 50 per 
cent in communication. The evidence suggests, in other words, that 
the disciplinary boundaries are hardening.  
Figure 2: Citations of Articles on the Chinese Media 
Note: 2012 citations represent only the first part of the year. 
Source: ISI Web of Science (numbers are approximate). 
Why do these data necessarily indicate a problem? What is the risk in 
continuing to live in parallel universes? On the one hand, while the 
political scientists’ focus on authoritarian control, dissent and re-
sistance is warranted – China is, after all, an authoritarian regime 
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what makes it an “exception”. Colin Sparks (2012), a leading media 
June 2011 March 2012 June 2012 March 2013
   0,00
   0,50
   1,00
   1,50
   2,00
   2,50
   3,00
   3,50
   4,00
   4,50
Month/Year
in
 p
er
 c
en
t
  Stability Maintenance and Chinese Media 7 

studies scholar, has recently urged a move “beyond political commu-
nication” towards a “broader perspective” on the Chinese press. 
Sparks argues that contemporary China bears little resemblance to the 
classic model of totalitarianism and that there is much more to talk 
about regarding the Chinese media than just how far journalists can 
push the boundaries. Political science’s narrow approach risks miss-
ing important developments outside the overtly political realm that 
nevertheless can have a broad impact on China’s society and politics. 
On the other hand, a weakness in much of the media studies 
scholarship lies in its lack of both critical language and empirical 
commitment regarding accounting for the impact of the party-state in 
the production, shaping and interpretation of media content. Zhao 
Yuezhi (2008), a political economist of Chinese media and communi-
cation, conceptualizes the Chinese state as “a contradictory entity and 
as a site of struggle between competing bureaucratic interests, diver-
gent social forces and different visions of Chinese modernity” (Zhao 
2008: 11). Much of this contradiction and complexity is illustrated in 
her analysis of the economics of the Chinese media, media policy and 
regulations, and the production of media content (Zhao 2008). How-
ever, in a large proportion of research on Chinese media practices, 
especially in the analysis of popular cultural expressions and enter-
tainment media content, the question of if and how the state func-
tions receives scant consideration. In China, even entertainment op-
tions are subtly shaped by party-state intervention, and when media 
scholars elide China’s political environment they risk missing a critical 
part of the picture. This is particularly so in the post-Mao context, 
where the adoption of a neoliberal logic is shown to have enriched 
and strengthened China’s authoritarian rule, calling for investigation 
into how the  
state and the private sphere, government and individuals are en-
gaged in co-production of practices, values, solutions that usually 
do not have a liberal democratic outcome (Ong and Zhang 2008: 
10). 
Scholars of the Chinese media often have differing underlying con-
ceptions of the Chinese political system. One school of thought sees 
the state – “forged in the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist social 
revolution, with a historically grounded popular base of legitimacy” 
(Zhao 2008: 177) – as being relatively secure and unwilling to imple-
ment systemic political change. Others are more sanguine about the 
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potential for democratic changes (at least around the margins) while 
recognizing that the Chinese party-state remains authoritarian and 
dependent on the propaganda system to maintain its power and legit-
imacy (e.g. Brady 2008). Both schools, however, are grounded in a 
historical perspective that builds upon earlier seminal work by schol-
ars like Franz Schurmann (1971), Stuart Schram (1984) and Michael 
Schoenhals (1992).  
Despite this shared commitment to the Chinese media’s histori-
cal background and trajectory, the disciplinary origins of political 
science and media studies are an important cause of their divergent 
focus and approach. Political science as a modern discipline arose in 
the United States in the late nineteenth century, a product of the 
Progressive Era’s fascination with measuring and quantifying social 
change. At first concerned primarily with deriving “universal laws”, 
with the start of the Cold War the discipline began to draw more 
heavily on “area studies” to gain insight into the rest of the world. 
Even though the field of “China studies” is now populated with Chi-
nese-born as well as Western scholars, its paradigm developed in a 
particularly Western framework of approaching China first and fore-
most as a communist, authoritarian regime. Political scientists are 
interested in the Chinese media and its communication system in part 
because they offer fertile ground to examine the potential emergence 
of civil society, the public sphere and democratization. For media 
scholars, this agenda represents a narrow-minded fixation on topics 
that have not changed in 30 years despite tectonic shifts in China’s 
underlying media landscape. The reluctance to acknowledge im-
portant changes outside political scientists’ worldview is exacerbated 
by a fetish for measuring and counting that strikes many media schol-
ars as misguided or worse. 
By contrast, the discipline of media studies, now also inhabited 
by China-born as well as Western academics, has attracted students 
from the general field of media studies instead of “China studies”. 
These scholars stand to inherit political communication’s more “uni-
versal” set of research paradigms, but for many political scientists, 
this approach risks devolving into a theory-laden exercise in triviality. 
Topics that are important for media scholars – questions of subjectiv-
ity, discourse, identity construction and so on – are seen as “fuzzy”: 
imprecise at best and incomprehensible at worst. At the same time, 
an overwhelming focus on “universal” theory risks building a Pro-
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crustean bed which forces China’s empirical realities into an ill-fitting 
theoretical framework. 
The scope of this topical issue is not overly ambitious. We do 
not claim to be able to illuminate the blind spots of both disciplines, 
nor we do believe that paradigms, perspectives and approaches 
formed over decades can be shifted overnight. What we do hope to 
do, instead, is to create a space whereby scholars from both discip-
lines can address the same empirical issue. In doing so, we hope con-
tributors will reveal differences and similarities in the ways in which 
they conceptualize, frame and approach media and communication. 
The point of departure for this exercise is that students of Chinese 
media and political communications from different disciplines share a 
wide range of common concerns, so they may want to avoid the sce-
nario of existing in parallel universes and start becoming more aware 
of each other’s different languages, methods and research agendas. At 
best, readers end up having an enriched, more nuanced perspective of 
the Chinese media and political communication. At worst, readers at 
least become aware that there is more than one way to research the 
Chinese media. 
We have identified “stability maintenance” (??, weiwen) as the 
most enduring and salient theme in understanding the political com-
munication in China. The late paramount Chinese leader Deng Xiao-
ping famously argued that “stability trumps all” (??????, wen-
ding yadao yiqie), and an obsession with maintaining social stability 
continues to drive the contemporary CCP. The current regime led by 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang is no exception. It is reported that the 
PRC now spends tens of billions of dollars on weiwen – more, indeed, 
than on external defence (Tsinghua University 2010). Given the im-
portance of weiwen to the CCP, officials use all available resources, 
from overt state oppression to subtle cultural manipulation, to main-
tain their goals. Having become both the means and the end, stability – 
or the threat of instability – has provided justification for oppression, 
censorship and media inaction. Weiwen has taken on a life of its own; 
it is now an assemblage of discourses, policies, processes and institu-
tions.  
Media control, unsurprisingly, is near the top of the agenda. One 
development of note is what David Bandurski at the University of 
Hong Kong’s China Media Project calls “control 2.0”. This strategy 
involves active manipulation of media and cultural messages to en-
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sure that the CCP stays ahead of and helps shape brewing storms; 
this strategy is proactive rather than reactive. Considering the wide 
scope of its activities and effects on the media, weiwen – including 
subtle techniques like “control 2.0” – is an important topic for both 
media scholars and political scientists. For the latter, weiwen provides 
an important window into the party-state’s structure, power and con-
cerns. Media and communications scholars, in turn, can examine how 
the CCP obsession with weiwen affects popular rhetoric and con-
sciousness. 
Papers and Themes 
Our contributors address and speak to the theme of stability main-
tenance and Chinese media and communication. The list of questions 
below, while not exhaustive, is intended to be indicative of a range of 
concerns: 
 What issues, phenomena and topics in Chinese politics and soci-
ety support the party-state’s means and goals of stability main-
tenance? 
 What is the role of the Chinese media and communication sys-
tem in maintaining stability? 
 What media and communication policies, processes and prac-
tices are implemented to maintain stability?  
 What aspects of the Chinese media present themselves as im-
portant and relevant prisms through which to explore stability 
maintenance? 
 What kind of model, paradigm, research agenda or approach is 
most useful and effective in addressing the issue of weiwen? 
 How does the CCP’s emphasis on weiwen affect media and com-
munication in China? 
Among the four contributors to this topical issue, two (Sun and Has-
sid) take a big-picture approach and two (Esarey and Han) zoom in 
on the language and motivations of particular individuals. While the 
scope of all four pieces differs, all authors are careful to draw links 
between particular regulations or individual actions and the stability 
of the Chinese political system as a whole. They work well together to 
remind both political scientists and communications scholars of the 
increasing – and often overlooked – importance that ostensibly apol-
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itical media content has in helping the CCP maintain power. As such, 
these contributions point the way toward future collaborative work 
and help nudge Chinese media scholarship beyond its disciplinary 
bailiwicks. 
Wanning Sun’s contribution, “From Poisonous Weeds to En-
dangered Species: Shenghuo TV, Media Ecology and Stability Main-
tenance”, is intended to set the scene for this topical issue on stability 
maintenance and media by providing a general context in which the 
three more empirically based papers are situated. Taking an unortho-
dox – even somewhat provocative – approach, she argues that  media 
and communication in China can be looked at as an ideological-
ecological system. More specifically, she suggests that by exploring 
the complex relationship and interaction between various media 
forms, genres and practices in the Chinese media and communication 
sector, we can arrive at a more nuanced and precise understanding of 
the relationship between China’s media practices and its ongoing 
objectives for stability maintenance. She concentrates not on the 
usual dichotomy of control and resistance but instead theorizes that 
the media as a whole, and especially the mundane, seemingly “apoliti-
cal” media, work toward maintaining equilibrium in the system. Her 
work sees areas of the media like lifestyle advice and consumer in-
formation as having “done more for stability maintenance and the 
party-state’s political legitimacy than have news and entertainment” 
by virtue of their ubiquity and apparent trustworthiness. As such, she 
brings needed attention to this area and argues that a vibrant and 
diverse entertainment landscape – albeit one within careful limits – 
plays a crucial role in maintaining China’s stability. Self-help and ad-
vice programming are particularly successful in this regard, she ar-
gues, as  
these programmes present themselves in such a way to have view-
ers believe that social issues such as poverty, unemployment, poor 
health, and so on, can in fact be solved […]. Instead of advocating 
social change, which might have political and ideological causes 
and consequences, these programmes present solutions which 
seem technical and scientific.  
By noting the hidden politics in the seemingly apolitical, and by ex-
amining the media ecosystem as a whole, this paper takes long strides 
towards reconciling the divergent media studies and political science 
worldviews.  
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Jonathan Hassid’s paper, “China’s Responsiveness to Internet 
Opinion: A Double-Edged Sword”, looks at how the party-state re-
sponds to the public pressure that builds when scandals are revealed. 
Using data from the international press, this contribution demon-
strates that compared to a number of countries around the world, 
China’s government acts unusually quickly to respond to and resolve 
ordinary citizens’ demands for punishment when misdeeds are un-
covered online or in the press. In the short run, this high level of 
official responsiveness to revealed scandal would seem to help Chi-
na’s weiwen goals, but in the long run, Hassid argues, this responsive-
ness might be misplaced. Rather than helping China build a more 
stable and independent judiciary, such responsiveness might under-
mine China’s fitful progress toward building the rule of law. And 
instead of helping the people who might need it most (but remain 
offline), the party-state is showing worrying signs of listening mostly 
to netizens, a highly elite and circumscribed section of the popula-
tion. Power holders’ responsiveness, in short, might help preserve 
stability in the short run by endangering it later on. 
Ashley Esarey’s “Winning Hearts and Minds? Cadres as Micro-
bloggers in China” scrutinizes individual officials and their motiva-
tions in choosing to promote official ideology on China’s rapidly 
growing weibo (Twitter-like microblog) systems. He concentrates in 
particular on three mid-level officials from around the country who 
have become popular on weibo for their attempts to engage with gov-
ernment critics. Although clearly inspired by the party-state’s desire to 
“maintain stability”, these three official microbloggers find only min-
imal, fleeting success in convincing their immediate critics. But per-
haps these immediate critics are not the true audience? His observa-
tion that 
the frequency with which the official microbloggers posted non-
political commentary, relative to political content, seemed to re-
flect a desire to put a human face on propaganda and ideological 
work 
in an effort to seek “the public’s empathy, acceptance and support”, 
mirrors Sun’s paper in arguing for renewed attention to the systemic 
impact of even seemingly apolitical media content. Such “soft” sto-
ries, they argue, help maintain CCP dominance and are arguably more 
important in shaping hearts and minds than the official media’s unin-
spiring, and unvarying, boilerplate. All in all, this is a remarkable 
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snapshot of the motivations and issues facing propagandists in a new 
world where weibo is “a powerful communication tool as well as a 
medium that could undermine traditional propaganda work”. 
Finally, Han Rongbin’s fascinating “Manufacturing Consent in 
Cyberspace: China’s ‘Fifty-Cent Army’”, investigates the effect of 
paid internet propagandists on the discourse of popular internet 
comment sites. This “fifty-cent army” – so called because they are 
supposedly paid 50 Chinese cents per post – is mostly recruited 
among media employees and college students, especially those who 
demonstrate “loyalty to the party-state and online communication 
skills”. The goal seems to be promotion of party-state interests with-
out using the heavy hand of existing censorship tools. Ultimately, 
many different party organizations and even large companies engage 
these paid commentators for “astroturfing”, the process of faking a 
groundswell of public support for political or economic gain. After a 
novel look at the recruitment, training and rewards of these commen-
tators, Han then looks at the systemic impact these “fifty-centers” 
might have. While they might be effective in distracting the public or 
channelling support on particular issues, such success is fleeting.  
The [online commentator] system has increasingly become a liabil-
ity rather than an asset. It is especially the case when the marks of 
state propaganda become too obvious, 
Han finds. When ordinary netizens can easily detect the official inter-
lopers, the party-state’s efforts backfire and create a more confronta-
tional public. In other words, unseen and unnoticed propaganda is 
often the most effective, and we hope other scholars continue to 
examine this fruitful area. 
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